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JUDGE BORK IS WRONG: TIE COVENANT IS
THE LAW
JOHN QUIGLEY-
I. INTRODUCTION
In Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, Judge Robert Bork suggested in
a concurring opinion that the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights' (Covenant) did not create a private cause of action for a victim of
human rights abuse.2 Bork's 1984 statement was a minor point in the
opinion in which it appeared and was not of immediate significance
because the United States had not ratified the Covenant.
In 1992, however, the United States did ratify the Covenant.3 Ratifica-
tion confronts the courts with the question whether the Covenant has effect
as domestic law. Thus, the position taken by Bork assumes a new
meaning. The issue is of no small moment because the Covenant is the
world's most significant treaty on rights in the civil-political realm.
An outgrowth of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948, 4
the Covenant was two decades in the drafting at the United Nations.'
Since its adoption in 1966, the Covenant has been the topic of sharp
controversy in the United States. As a result, it was only last year that the
United States ratified the Covenant. The Covenant covers a broad spectrum
of rights of the type found in the U.S. Bill of Rights and in some instances
it provides even broader protection.
* Professor of Law, Ohio State University; LL.B. Harvard Law School 1966; M.A. Harvard
University 1966. For insights that informed his thinking on the topic of this Article, the author is
indebted to participants at a symposium on U.S. ratification of the Covenant held at DePaul University
College of Law, Feb. 25, 1993.
1. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, adopted on Dec. 19, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S.
171 (entered into force March 23, 1976) [hereinafter Covenant].
2. Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 818-19 & n.26 (D.C. Cir. 1984), cert.
denied, 470 U.S. 1003 (1985).
3. See White House Statement on Signing the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights, 28 WEEKLY COMP. PRMS. Doc. 1008 (June 5, 1992). See also Statement of George Bush, U.S.
President (June 1, 1992) (on file with author) (President Bush stating, in part, "I... ratify and confirm
the said Covenant, subject to the said reservations, understandings and declarations").
4. G.A. Res. 217A, U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., pt.1 U.N. Doe. A/810 (1948).
5. G.A. Res. 2200, U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, at 52-60, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966).
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If Judge Bork was correct that the Covenant does not create a private
cause of action, the impact of the Covenant in U.S. law is significantly
reduced because a private litigant will not be able to assert a right
affirmatively. The issue of the domestic force of the Covenant is further
complicated by the fact that the Senate, in a declaration accompanying its
consent to ratification, suggested that the Covenant should not be deemed
self-executing.6 The Senate's position leads in the same direction as
Bork's.
This Article examines the U.S. ratification of the International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights in light of Judge Bork's position and the
Senate declaration. The Article also focuses on determining the proper
status of the Covenant before U.S. courts.
II. SIGNIFICANCE OF JUDICIAL ENFORCEABILITY OF THE COVENANT
The question of the domestic effect of the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights is one of first impression for state and federal
courts because the Covenant entered into force for the United States on
September 8, 1992.' To date no court has issued a post-ratification ruling
on whether the Covenant may form the basis of a lawsuit by a person
seeking to vindicate a right.
The Covenant, however, will not be entirely new territory for the courts.
Judges have long referred to the Covenant as a benchmark in determining
whether one right or another has entered into the unwritten body of
international law known as custom.8 That body of law is applied by U.S.
courts as part of the common law.9
If the Covenant creates a private cause of action, litigants seeking to
enjoin government action will be able to use it as a jurisdictional base.'0
Under the federal code, district courts have "original jurisdiction of all civil
actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United
States.""
6. 138 CONG. REc. S4783-84 (daily ed. Apr. 2, 1992).
7. The U.S. submitted its instrument of ratification June 8, 1992. The Covenant entered into
force three months after this submission.
8. See Filartiga v. Pefia-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1984) (relying on United Nations Charter
to determine that torture violates international law).
9. Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900).
10. See Bodemfller v. United States, 39 F. 437 (W.D. La. 1889).
11. 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1988).
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The Covenant contains a full complement of rights. The scope of these
rights is determined through the application of the Covenant in domestic
courts around the world and in the Human Rights Committee (Committee)
that monitors compliance with the Covenant.12 The Committee has forged
a substantial body of case law construing Covenant guarantees. Like the
federal and state constitutions in the United States, the Covenant is
constantly being construed and rights interpreted.
Judge Bork's conclusion in Tel-Oren that the Covenant does not create
a private cause of action is based on four arguments. First, Bork stated that
the Covenant becomes domestic law only if Congress passes legislation
implementing it in domestic law. 3
Second, Bork stated that the Covenant contains no explicit statement that
an individual has a cause of action. Judge Bork concludes that the
omission means that no such cause of action exists.14 Third, Bork stated
that the absence of automatic remedies under the Covenant at the
international level means that there are no automatic remedies at the
domestic level.'"
Fourth, Bork stated that even if one could read the Covenant to create a
private cause of action against the government of the state that has
jurisdiction, it would not create a cause of action to challenge the actions
of other states. 6 The validity of Bork's four arguments is far from
obvious. This Article will now consider each argument in turn.
III. WHETHER THE COVENANT MUST BE IMPLEMENTED
LEGISLATIVELY
First, Bork states that treaties like the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights "expressly oblige states to enact implementing
legislation, thus impliedly denying a private cause of action.' 7 He refers
explicitly to Article 2 as the provision that requires states to enact
implementing legislation."
In this argument, Bork utilizes the principle long accepted in U.S. courts
that if a treaty or a treaty provision contemplates legislative action for its
12. Covenant, supra note 1, art. 28 (establishing the Human Rights Committee).
13. Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d at 819 n.26.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d at 818.
18. Id. at 818-19.
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implementation, then there is no contemplation that the treaty or the treaty
provision acts on its own accord to enter into domestic law. 9 The
contemplation is rather that each state party will enact legislation that will
put the provision into domestic law, in this case, legislation that would
specify that the courts should entertain causes of action based on the
Covenant.
The difficulty in Bork's reasoning, however, is that Article 2 is not such
a provision. Its purpose is to ensure that states provide remedies for
violations of the Covenant. Article 2, to be sure, does contemplate the
possibility of legislation if it is necessary in a particular state to put the
Covenant into force as domestic law. Article 2(2) provides:
Where not already provided for by existing legislative or other measures,
each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes to take the necessary
steps, in accordance with its constitutional processes and with the provisions
of the present Covenant, to adopt such legislative or other measures as may
be necessary to give effect to the rights recognized in the present Cove-
nant.
20
From the standpoint of Article 2, however, it is irrelevant whether a state
enacts legislation to provide that a violation may be remedied by a private
cause of action, or whether the courts simply entertain private causes of
action by virtue of the state's ratification of the Covenant. Some delegates
at the drafting conference said that there was no need for a provision like
Article 2 because it was "obvious that if the States undertook to abide by
the covenant, they would have to provide for effective remedies against
infringements." 21 Such provision of remedies could come through legisla-
tion, or action by the courts, but it would not necessarily have to come
through legislation.
Treaties are the "law of the land" under the Constitution's Supremacy
Clause, which specifies that "the Judges in every State shall be bound
thereby." The courts have not held all treaty provisions judicially
enforceable, but if a treaty is capable of judicial enforcement, the courts
must permit a private litigant to rely upon it as the basis for a cause of
action.' According to the Restatement (Third) Foreign Relations Law of
19. Foster & Elam v. Neilson, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253, 314 (1829).
20. Covenant, supra note 1, art. 2(2).
21. E/CN.4/SR.125, at 4 (F), quoted in MARC J. BossUyT, GUIDE TO THE "TRAVAUX
PRtPARATOIRES" OF THE INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLmCAL RIGHTs 64 (1987).
22. U.S. CoNsT. art. V.
23. Foster & Elam, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) at 314 ("Our constitution declares a treaty to be the law of
the land. It is, consequently, to be regarded in courts ofjustice as equivalent to an act of the legislature,
[VOL. 71:1087
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the United States, "agreements that can be readily given effect by executive
or judicial bodies, federal or State, without further legislation, are deemed
self-executing, unless a contrary intention is manifest." 24 By "self-execut-
ing," the Restatement refers to the Supreme Court's concept that certain
treaty provisions automatically enter domestic law.'
The Covenant's provisions guaranteeing rights are the type of treaty
provision that U.S. courts have traditionally found self-executing.26 The
drafters intend these provisions to create rights that inure to the benefit of
the parties who are asserting them.
The courts said that while the Supremacy Clause makes treaties the "law
of the land," some treaty provisions read as obligations to take future action
that in turn will bring about the contemplated result. In Foster & Elam v.
Neilson,27 the Supreme Court examined a treaty in which Spain ceded
Florida to the United States. The treaty required the United States to
respect land grants previously made in the territory by Spain. It said that
the Spanish grants "shall be ratified and confirmed to the persons in
possession of the lands, to the same extent that the same grants would be
valid if the territories had remained under the dominion of his catholic
majesty. '28 In the Court's reading of this provision, the United States
obligated itself to enact legislation to ensure that the U.S. would respect the
titles of Spanish grantees. "[W]hen the terms of the stipulation import a
contract," the Court said, "when either of the parties engages to perform a
particular act, the treaty addresses itself to the political, not the judicial
department; and the legislature must execute the contract before it can
become a rule for the Court."29  Thus, the Court said that a Spanish
grantee could not sue on the basis of the treaty to confirm his title.
However, in a subsequent case, United States v. Percheman,° involving
the same treaty, the Supreme Court reversed itself after the Spanish text of
the treaty was brought to its attention. Whereas the English text read that
whenever it operates of itself without the aid of any legislative provision.").
24. RESTATEMENT (rHIRD) FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 111 reporter's
note 5 (1987).
25. Foster & Elarm, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) at 314; United States v. Percheman, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 51, 87-89
(1833).
26. John Quigley, The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the Supremacy
Clause, 42 DEPAUL L. REV. 1287 (1993).
27. 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253 (1829).
28. Id. at 314.
29. Id.
30. 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 51 (1833).
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the Spanish grants "shall be ratified," the Spanish text said that the grants
"shall remain ratified."31 The Court noted the general rule in international
law that when territory is ceded land titles are not affected. The Court
concluded that the provision meant that Spanish titles were to continue in
force without the need for legislation.32 Thus, a Spanish grantee could sue
to confirm his title and the courts would apply the treaty as law.
In line with Percheman, courts have typically held rights provisions in
treaties to be self-executing. Extradition treaties typically impose certain
requirements for an extradition, such as allowing extradition only for
certain offenses. U.S. courts have routinely considered such provisions as
according rights to a potential extraditee which he can assert on the basis
of the treaty.33 Courts have similarly read treaties limiting the seizure of
vessels off the U.S. coast to accord rights that an accused criminal can
assert to set aside the seizure and thus defeat a prosecution.34 A court has
held that a treaty giving citizens of another state the right to be informed,
upon arrest, of their right under a consular treaty to contact a consul can be
invoked by the arrestee to defeat the arrest.35
The Ninth Circuit, in Saipan v. United States Department of the
Interior,36 considered the self-executing character of a clause in the
trusteeship treaty for Saipan which protected residents' land and resourc-
es.37 After the Saipan government approved the construction of a hotel, a
group of residents objected on environmental grounds.38 The court found
that one purpose of the treaty was to protect the environment of Saipan and
that the residents were the intended beneficiaries.39 The court determined
that the treaty provision was self-executing, meaning that the residents
could sue to challenge the hotel construction.4"
31. Id. at 88.
32. Id. at 88-89.
33. See, e.g., United States v. Rauscher, 119 U.S. 407 (1886).
34. See Cook v. United States, 288 U.S. 102, 120-22 (1933).
35. United States v. Calderon-Medina, 591 F.2d 529, 531 (9th Cir. 1979), appeal after remand
sub noma. United States v. Rangel-Gonzales, 617 F.2d 529, 530 (9th Cir. 1980) (finding a deportation
order invalid for failure to inform detainee of right to contact consul, as guaranteed by treaty and by
Immigration and Naturalization Service regulation requiring compliance with treaty).
36. Saipan v. United States Dep't of the Interior, 502 F.2d 90 (9th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420
U.S. 1003 (1975).
37. Id. at 97.
38. Id. at 93.
39. Id. at 97.
40. Id. at 98.
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The Ninth Circuit gave a list of factors it found relevant to deciding
whether the provision was self-executing: "the purposes of the treaty and
the objectives of its creators, the existence of domestic procedures and
institutions appropriate for direct implementation, the availability and
feasibility of alternative enforcement methods, and the immediate and long-
range social consequences of self- or non-self-execution." '41
These four factors, if applied to the Covenant, lead to the conclusion that
it too is self-executing, at least regarding its provisions guaranteeing rights
to individuals. First, the purpose of a treaty provision that an individual
should enjoy, for example, freedom of conscience, is that the individual
enjoy that right. Thus, the purpose of the provision is served by permitting
affirmative litigation if the right is in jeopardy.
Second, domestic procedures, namely litigation in state or federal courts,
are available and feasible as a means of enforcing Covenant-guaranteed
rights. Third, alternative enforcement methods are few because interna-
tional procedures for enforcement of the Covenant are weak.42
Fourth, the consequences of non-self-execution are serious because it
puts the United States out of the mainstream of international rights
enforcement. Most other states that are parties to the Covenant permit
invocation of the Covenant affirmatively in their courts. If litigants cannot
hold the United States to the Covenant's standards, the U.S. risks falling
below those standards.
Of the four factors listed by the court in Saipan, the first is the most
significant, namely, whether the parties intended that the rights provisions
of the Covenant should be usable by a litigant as a basis for a cause of
action. If one analyzes the specific rights guaranteed by the Covenant, it
becomes clear that the rights are of that type.
For example, a Covenant right to a fair judicial hearing43 or to priva-
cy' is clearly aimed at creating for every individual a corresponding right.
There is no reason for agreeing by treaty to a right to a fair judicial
hearing, or to privacy, unless the parties contemplated that individuals
41. Saipan, 502 F.2d at 97.
42. The United States has filed a declaration allowing other states parties to the Covenant to file
a complaint against it before the Human Rights Committee. 138 CONG. REC. S4783-84 (daily ed. Apr.
2, 1992). However, no state has ever filed against another state. The United States has not ratified the
Optional Protocol that permits individuals to file a complaint with the Committee. Optional Protocol
to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 19, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171
[hereinafter Optional Protocol].
43. Covenant, supra note 1, art. 14.
44. Id. at art. 17.
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should have such rights and that they should be able to enforce them in
court if necessary.
The Covenant recites that each state party "undertakes to respect and to
ensure to all individuals ... the rights recognized in the present Cove-
nant."'45 The implication is that a state party must allow individuals legal
recourse if rights are infringed.46
IV. WHETHER THE OMISSION OF A STATEMENT THAT INDIVIDUALS
MAY SUE PRECLUDES SUCH A RIGHT
Judge Bork also argued that the Covenant creates no private cause of
action because it does not explicitly create a private cause of action.
"[T]he covenant does not itself say individuals can sue; rather, it leaves to
states the fulfillment of an obligation to create private rights of action."47
Bork correctly stated that the Covenant does not specify that individuals
have a cause of action to vindicate Covenant-guaranteed rights. However,
treaties in the past have not contained such a specification. The United
States Supreme Court has not held this omission to bar an individual cause
of action for a right guaranteed by a treaty. In Percheman, for example,
the treaty between Spain and the United States contained no provision
stating that a Spanish grantee could sue in a U.S. court for recognition of
his Spanish land grant.48 Nonetheless, the Court permitted such a suit.49
The Court, without addressing the issue explicitly, derived a cause of action
because the treaty gave the grantee a right.50
Moreover, the Covenant, unlike the U.S.-Spain treaty, does address the
issue of domestic enforcement and suggests that a cause of action exists.
Article 2 requires each state party "[t]o ensure that any person whose rights
or freedoms as herein recognized are violated shall have an effective
remedy."' Article 2 further requires each state party "[to ensure that any
person claiming such a remedy shall have his right thereto determined by
competent judicial, administrative or legislative authorities, or by any other
45. Id. at art 2(1).
46. See infta notes 51-52 and accompanying text (discussing remaining provisions of art. 2).
47. Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d at 819 n.26.
48. 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) at 88.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 89.
51. Covenant, supra note 1, art. 2(3)(a).
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competent authority provided for by the legal system of the State, and to
develop the possibilities of judicial remedy."52
This provision, though hardly a model of clarity, indicates that
individuals are to be accorded whatever remedies the legal system of the
particular state provides to vindicate their rights. The phrase, which calls
for the development of "the possibilities of judicial remedy," shows a
preference for judicial remedy, but leaves the state to allow the individual
to seek enforcement by legislative or administrative remedies.
In the United States, such legislative remedies exist only by private bill,
a procedure which is not likely to provide redress in many instances.
Administrative remedies are limited as well. Lawsuits are the only readily
available mechanisms for vindication of rights. Thus, if the United States
is to carry out the mandate of Article 2 under procedures currently
available in U.S. law, courts must entertain suits filed by individuals
alleging a violation of their Covenant-guaranteed rights.
V. WHETHER THE ABSENCE OF AUTOMATIC REMEDIES AT THE
INTERNATIONAL LEVEL MEANS THAT THERE ARE No SUCH REMEDIES
AT THE DOMESTIC LEVEL
As an additional argument for the proposition that there is no cause of
action under the Covenant, Bork asserts that on the international plane a
state party is not subject to suit unless it consents to be sued. Mere
adherence to the Covenant does not constitute consent. He states that
Article 41 of the Covenant establishes a procedure whereby one state party
may file a complaint against another state party before a Human Rights
Committee.53 He further notes that a state party is subject to the Human
Rights Committee's jurisdiction only if it files a special declaration under
Article 41 signifying its consent.54
Bork also refers to the Covenant's Optional Protocol,55 whereby states
may agree to allow individuals to file complaints against them before the
Committee.56 States parties to the Covenant may choose whether or not
to adhere to the Optional Protocol.57 Bork notes that here, as with inter-
52. Id. at art. 2(3)(b).
53. Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d at 819 n.26. Bork states, incorrectly, that the Committee is established by
Article 41. In fact, it is established by Article 28.
54. Id.
55. Optional Protocol, supra note 42.
56. Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d at 819 n.26.
57. Id.
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state complaints, the state is subject to the procedure only if it makes that
choice. 8
On this basis, Bork argues that states are not subject to enforcement of
the Covenant against them in domestic courts because if states were subject
to such enforcement, they would have no additional expression of consent
beyond their adherence to the Covenant. 9
This logic is weak. The fact that the procedures before the Human
Rights Committee are at the option of the states parties does not mean that
domestic enforcement is optional as well. There is simply no link between
the two.6
VI. WHETHER RIGHTS AGAINST OTHER STATES CAN BE VINDICATED
Bork used this as a reason to conclude that there is no private cause of
action under the Covenant. His statement reads:
The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights directs states to
provide a forum for private vindication of rights under the Covenant. That
provision, however, should not be taken to suggest the Covenant grants or
recognizes a private right of action in municipal courts in a case like this.
First, the Covenant directs states to provide forums only for the vindication
of rights against themselves, not for the vindication of rights against other
states. It is only the latter that raises all the political, foreign relations
problems that lie behind international law's general rule against private causes
of action; thus, even if the Covenant suggests recognition of a private cause
of action for the former, it does not do so for the latter.
61
Bork's reasoning here is also weak. Conceivably, there might be a
reason not to recognize a private cause of action in domestic courts against
a foreign state because of considerations of sovereign immunity62 or
difficulties of enforcement of judgments. However, that would bear no
relevance to the question whether a state must allow its courts to entertain
58. Id.
59. Id. at 819.
60. Bork does not press this argument as strongly as the others. He states merely that "[i]t is
worth noting" that the international remedies are optional. Id. at 819 n.26.
61. Id.
62. Siderman de Blake v. Argentina, 965 F.2d 699 (9th Cir. 1992) (holding that sovereign
immunity barred suit against Argentina for acts by Argentine officials in Argentina unless, as the court
found, Argentina had waived its immunity), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1812 (1993). Saudi Arabia v.
Nelson, 113 S. Ct. 1471 (1993). In Nelson, the Court held that sovereign immunity barred a suit against
Saudi Arabia for alleged torture by Saudi police. The alleged torture occurred in Saudi Arabia where
the plaintiff, a U.S. citizen, had been recruited to work. The plaintiff asserted that the activity fell
within the commercial activity exception because he was employed in Saudi Arabia.
[VOL. 71:1087
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suits brought against itself. Thus, Bork's point does not go to the issue of
suits in a state's courts against that state.
Beyond this, however, there is no reason that individuals should not be
permitted to file suit against a foreign state under the Covenant. Article 2
draws no such distinction. It broadly refers to the need for effective
remedies for any person whose rights under the Covenant are in question.
To be sure, the primary target of suits filed by individuals is likely to be
the state in whose courts the suits are brought. However, no limitation is
drawn in Article 2.63
Human rights law creates obligations for states not only toward the
individuals whose rights are at issue, but also toward other states. This
latter obligation is expressed in the concept of obligation erga omnes.
States are deemed to have an interest in the protection of rights by other
states on the theory that a just and stable international community is
premised on the observance of rights by all states.' Thus, there is no
impropriety in a state making its courts available to suits by individuals
suing foreign states for violation of Covenant-guaranteed rights.65
States are normally exempted from being sued in foreign courts by the
doctrine of sovereign immunity. However, immunity can be waived, and
Article 2 may constitute such a waiver. Because Article 2 contemplates
judicial enforcement, states parties adhering to the Covenant indicate that
they anticipate the possibility that they may be sued in domestic courts for
violation of Covenant-guaranteed rights.66
VII. DEFENSIVE INVOCATION OF THE COVENANT
The preceding discussion overstates the significance of the Bork analysis
in one respect. Even if the analysis was correct, it would not preclude all
use of the Covenant in litigation. Even if the Covenant was found not to
create a private cause of action in U.S. courts, the Covenant could
nonetheless be invoked defensively by an individual against whom legal
63. Cf. Denegri v. Chile, No. 86-3085, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4233, at *8 (D.D.C. April 3, 1992).
In Denegri, the plaintiff sought to sue Chile for human rights violations and asserted that Chile waived
immunity by adhering to the Covenant. The court concluded that the Covenant does not provide a
cause of action against foreign states in U.S. courts. The court did not, however, discuss Article 2 or
any specific articles of the Covenant.
64. THEODOR MERON, HuMAN RIGHTS AND HuMANTAIr A NoRMs AS CUSTOMARY LAW 178-
189 (1984). Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Co., Ltd. (Belg. v. Spain), 1970 I.C.J. 3, 33 (Feb. 5).
65. See 28 U.S.C. § 1330 (1988) (providing for jurisdiction in federal courts for actions against
a foreign state).
66. See supra note 63.
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action is being taken. Thus, even if, to revert to the prior example, an
individual were not permitted to sue to enforce the privacy right guaranteed
by the Covenant, an individual could invoke the Covenant's privacy
provision as a defense to a criminal charge. For example, a defendant
criminally charged with sodomy could invoke the Covenant's privacy
provision.
Judge Bork, in his Tel-Oren concurring opinion, was addressing solely
the question of affirmative use of human rights norms and whether a
private cause of action existed for that purpose. He did not address the
question of defensive use of human rights norms. It is more likely that
individuals will seek to rely on the Covenant from a defensive posture.67
This is particularly true with regard to the extensive array of rights
provided by the Covenant for criminal trials.68  Although many of the
rights protected by the Covenant are also protected under United States law,
in certain instances their scope may be broader under the Covenant.
69
It will be the rare instance in which an individual sues to enforce
Covenant rights related to a criminal prosecution. More typically a person
who is charged with or has been convicted of a crime will claim that a
right guaranteed by the Covenant has been violated. In a Kentucky case,
67. For example, the courts have allowed persons under deportation orders to use the definition
of refugee found in the Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, Jan. 31, 1967, 19 U.S.T. 6223,
T.I.A.S. No. 6577, 606 U.N.T.S. 267 entered into force Oct. 4, 1967. Because the Protocol aimed at
ensuring rights to individuals, the courts have found it directly applicable. See, e.g., Cariolan v.
Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 559 F.2d 993, 996-97 (5th Cir. 1977); Kashani v. Immigration &
Naturalization Serv., 547 F.2d 376, 379 (7th Cir. 1977).
68. The Covenant guarantees a fair hearing, Covenant, supra note 1, art. 14(1); openness of court
proceedings, id.; a presumption of innocence, id. at art. 14(2); a right to be informed in detail of the
charges, id. at art. 14(3)(a); an opportunity to prepare a defense, Id. at art. 14(3)(b); a speedy trial, id.
at art. 14(3)(c); a right to defend at the trial in person or through counsel of choice, including free
counsel where required, id. at art. 14(3)(d); a right to cross-examine prosecution witnesses and to
compel the attendance of defense witnesses, id. at art. 14(3)(e); assistance without charge of an
interpreter if required, id. at art. 14(3)(f); protection against self-incrimination, 39/40 (1984); special
proceedings for juveniles, 6 ( 16), U.N. Doc. A/39/40 (1984); a right to appeal a conviction, Covenant,
supra note 1, art. 14(5); compensation for punishment under a false conviction, Id. at art. 14(6);
protection against double jeopardy (7.3), U.N. Doe. A/43/40 (1988); prosecution only for an act that
was an offense at the time committed, Covenant, supra note 1, art. 15(l); protection against a penalty
heavier than that in force at the time of the act, id.; a guarantee of a lighter penalty if, following
sentencing, the legislature reduces the penalty for the offense, id.; and a guarantee to equal protection
of the laws, id. at art. 26.
69. See John Quigley, Criminal Law and Human Rights: Implications of the United States
Ratification of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 6 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 59
(1993).
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Commonwealth v. Hawes," a person extradited to the United States
argued that he could be tried only for the offense on which extradition had
been granted. Under the relevant extradition treaty, the extradited person
enjoyed such a right.7 The Kentucky Court of Appeals found:
When it is provided by treaty that ... certain limitations ... shall not be
disregarded or exceeded by the contracting parties, the compact does not need
to be supplemented by legislative or executive action, to authorize the courts
of justice to decline to override those limitations or to exceed the prescribed
restrictions, for the palpable and all-sufficient reason, that to do so would be
not only to violate the public faith, but to transgress the "supreme law of the
land."72
The U.S. Senate appears to have followed the distinction between
offensive and defensive use when it considered the question of the
Covenant's effect in domestic law. The Senate, charged under the
Constitution with the task of giving consent to treaties that the President
seeks to ratify,73 considered the Covenant at the request of President
George Bush.74 The Senate, following consideration in the Foreign
Relations Committee, adopted a resolution of consent.'5 At Bush's
suggestion, the Committee, and later the full Senate, appended to the
resolution of consent a statement denominated "declaration" stating that
Articles 1 to 27 of the Covenant, namely, all the Covenant's provisions
guaranteeing rights, should not be deemed self-executing.76
The meaning of this phrase is not immediately obvious. By saying that
the Covenant was not self-executing, the Senate could have meant that the
Covenant was not to be invoked before courts in any way. On the other
hand, the Senate could have meant only that the Covenant may not be
invoked affirmatively. The Foreign Relations Committee indicated that the
70. Commonwealth v. Hawes, 76 Ky. (13 Bush) 697 (1878).
71. Id. at 699.
72. Id. at 702-03 (holding that an individual on trial after being extradited from a foreign state
could insist that he be tried only for the offense on which extradition was sought). See also United
States v. Rauscher, 119 U.S. 407, 427-28 (1886) (characterizing the quoted statement in Hawesas "very
able").
73. U.S. CoNsT. art. II, § 2.
74. U.S. Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Report (to accompany Executive E, 95-2),
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1992), at 25, reprinted in 31 INT'L LEG. MAT.,
648, 660 (1992) (text of letter of George Bush to Senator Pell, Chairman, Committee on Foreign
Relations, Aug. 8, 1991). Bush Urges Senate to Ratify U.N. Civil Rights Covenant, Reuters AM cycle,
Sept. 10, 1991, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Currnt file.
75. 138 CoNG. REc. S4783-84 (daily ed. Apr. 2, 1992).
76. Id. at S4784.
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latter was its purpose. "The intent," it said in its explanation of the
provision, "is to clarify that the Covenant will not create a private cause of
action in U.S. courts."77  The Committee apparently did not mean to
preclude defensive invocation.78
There is little sense in a distinction between affirmative and defensive
use of a Covenant right. For example, if an individual may invoke a
Covenant provision on nondiscrimination as a defense against some adverse
governmental action, why would that same individual not be permitted to
use the Covenant in affirmative litigation to protect the same right?
VIII. THE LEGAL EFFECT OF THE SENATE'S DECLARATION
Moreover, it is not clear whether the Senate's declaration about self-
execution is relevant to a court. Under established precedent, courts decide
whether a treaty provision is self-executing.79 No case has reached the
courts in which such a Senate provision was at issue.
The Restatement (Third) Foreign Relations Law of the United States
takes the view that such a declaration binds the courts. Its authors reason:
Since the President can make a treaty only with the advice and consent of the
Senate, he must give effect to conditions imposed by the Senate on its
consent. The President generally includes a verbatim recitation of any
proposed reservation, statement of understanding, or other declaration relevant
to the application or interpretation of the treaty contained in the Senate
resolution of consent, both in the instrument notifying the other state or the
depositary of United States ratification or accession and in the proclamation
of the treaty."0
President Bush did include the Senate's declaration, along with other
qualifying statements adopted by the Senate, when he filed the U.S.
ratification of the Covenant with the Secretary-General of the United
Nations."'
The Restatement view has never been tested judicially. Its reasoning is
attractive; because the President needs the Senate's consent, the Senate may
77. U.S. Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Report (to accompany Executive E, 95-2), at
19, reprinted in 31 INT'L LEG. MAT. at 657.
78. Cf. An Act to Implement the United States-Canada Free-Trade Agreement, Pub. Law No. 100-
449, § 102, 102 Stat. 1851 (1988) (providing, "No person ... shall ... have any cause of action or
defense under the Agreement"; thus, when Congress wants to preclude defensive use of a treaty it does
so explicitly).
79. Foster & Elam, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) at 314-15; Percheman, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) at 87-89.
80. RESTATEMENT, supra note 24, § 314, cmt. b.
81. See supra note 3.
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impose conditions. The greater power to reject the treaty might seem to
include a lesser power to require a specific change. However, this
approach would create serious problems if implemented with respect to the
Covenant. As indicated above, if the courts were to follow the declaration
and thus reject private causes of action based on the Covenant, they would
put the United States in violation of Article 2.82 The Restatement authors
did not address the situation in which a Senate condition runs counter to an
obligation of the treaty to which the Senate gave its consent.
Beyond that circumstance, the question also arises as to the status of a
Senate condition. Under the Constitution, the Senate's role is limited to
advising the President about the treaty and giving its consent. The
Constitution does not contemplate a direct Senate role in writing treaty
language. Certainly, the Senate could inform the President that it will
refuse to give consent unless the treaty is changed in a particular fashion.
However, this is far short of a right on the part of the Senate to draft
language that in effect becomes part of the treaty, at least as the treaty is
to be implemented in U.S. courts.
In particular, a Senate condition concerning a treaty's effect as domestic
law is questionable. Until recently, the Senate had shied from such
efforts. 3 No one has challenged the role of the courts in deciding this
question with respect to a particular treaty provision."4
An additional reason to doubt the validity of the Senate declaration is
that although the declaration was intended by the Senate to be communicat-
ed to the Secretary-General, and thus to the other states parties, and it was
so communicated by President Bush, it was not written as part of the treaty.
Under international law, that which is binding as a "treaty" includes only
the text of the treaty and any reservations made to that text. 5 Under the
Supremacy Clause, only a "treaty" becomes the "law of the land." A
declaration contained in a Senate resolution of consent is not a "treaty.8 6
Moreover, the Senate's declaration is not an act of Congress because the
82. See supra notes 19-20 and accompanying text.
83. See Covey T. Oliver, Treaties, the Senate and the Constitution: Some Current Questions, 51
AM. J. INT'L L. 606, 609 (1957).
84. See id.
85. VIENNA CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF TREATIES, adopted May 23, 1969, entered into force
Jan. 27, 1980, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.39/27 (1969). See id. at art. 2(l)(a) (defining "treaty" as an
agreement in either a single instrument or two or more related instruments); art. 2(1)(d) (defining
reservation as a statement by a state purporting to modify the effect of the treaty); arts. 19-23 (stating
procedure on reservations).
86. U.S. CONST. art. VI.
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House of Representatives played no role in its adoption. Thus, it would not
appear to be anything more than a non-binding expression of Senate
preference on the matter.
This issue has come before the courts only once. In Power Authority of
New York v. Federal Power Commission,87 the Senate in its resolution of
consent to a bilateral treaty with Canada on electrical power generation
stated that the United States' share of the power to be generated would be
allocated within the United States only by an act of Congress.8 The court
held, however, that this statement by the Senate was of no effect because
it was not a reservation, and hence not part of the treaty.89
A major reason the court said that the statement did not constitute a
reservation was that it did not alter the legal relationship between Canada
and the United States. It related, rather, solely to how the United States
might use the electrical power it would gain under the treaty. Under the
Covenant, the Senate's declaration on self-execution does implicate the
rights of the other states parties. Under Article 2, they have a right to
expect that the United States will permit domestic enforcement of
Covenant-guaranteed rights.9" If the United States fails to do that, the
rights of the other states parties are violated.
This fact makes the Senate's declaration on self-execution of the
Covenant closer to a reservation than was true of the Senate statement
regarding electrical power under the U.S.-Canada treaty. Other states
parties may consider the declaration a reservation even though it is not
denominated as such by the Senate or the President.
If the declaration is a reservation, then, in the sense of the Supremacy
Clause, it would be part of the treaty. Nevertheless, the reservation might
be invalid for violating Article 2. However, a court would be hard pressed
to decide that the declaration is a reservation if the President and the Senate
state that it is not.
IX. THE COVENANT AS DOMESTIC LAW BY VIRTUE OF BEING
CUSTOMARY LAW
One final implication of Judge Bork's view that the Covenant creates no
private cause of action relates, to the Covenant's status as customary law.
87. 247 F.2d 538 (D.C. Cir.) vacated sub nom. American Pub. Power Ass'n v. Power Auth. of
New York, 355 U.S. 64 (1957).
88. Id. at 539.
89. Id. at 543-44.
90. See supra notes 20-21 and accompanying text.
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Even if no private cause of action exists under the Covenant, the Covenant
may nonetheless be applicable as customary law and applied as such by the
courts. Customary law is the unwritten body of international law based on
the practice of states.9
Customary international law is part of the law of the United States,
accepted into domestic law on the rationale that in England the customary
law of nations constituted part of the common law.9' Many of the major
postulates of human rights law as found in treaties have entered into
customary law. The Restatement lists as acts prohibited by customary law:
genocide, slavery, murder, causing disappearance, torture or other cruel,
inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment, prolonged arbitrary
detention, systematic racial discrimination, or a consistent pattern of gross
violations of rights.93 The Restatement authors added that this list "is not
necessarily complete, and is not closed: human rights not listed in this
section may have achieved the status of customary law, and some rights
might achieve that status in the future."'94
There is reason to conclude that many rights not listed by the Restate-
ment have entered customary law, but the matter is one for court determina-
tion. For a potential plaintiff, customary law is a less solid base for suit
than a treaty. Rights provided under customary law may, according to one
view, be disregarded by the executive. Customary law is difficult to
determine and apply because the courts must search the practices of states
around the world to determine whether the right exists, and if it does, its
precise scope.96
Federal statutes do not specifically provide for jurisdiction in federal
courts where violations of customary law are alleged.97 Thus, litigants are
left to claim jurisdiction under the general federal jurisdiction rubric, 28
91. International Court of Justice Statute, art. 38(l)(b).
92. See Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. at 700.
93. RESTATEMENT, supra note 24, § 702.
94. Id. § 702 cmt. a.
95. Garcia-Mir v. Meese, 788 F.2d 1446, 1453 (1lth Cir. 1986) (citing U.S. Supreme Court
language in Paquete Habana that customary law is binding on the courts only in the absence of a
controlling executive decision). But see Jordan J. Paust, The President Is Bound by International Law,
81 AM. J. INT'L L. 377 (1987).
96. MERON, supra note 64, at 119. See, e.g., Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 881-85, for the court's
analysis to determine whether torture was prohibited by customary law.
97. See 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1988) (referring to the Constitution, laws, and treaties of the United
States).
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U.S.C. § 1331, by asserting that customary law is federal common law.98
Nonetheless, if a court refuses to apply the Covenant as such, customary
law remains a viable argument for a plaintiff to establish both jurisdiction
and a cause of action.
X. THE COVENANT AS A MEANS OF CONSTRUING OTHER RIGHTS
One final manner in which the Covenant could still be effective as U.S.
law even absent a finding that it can form the basis of a cause of action is
its possible application in construing rights in state or federal constitutional
law. Thus, a person suing to establish a right and relying on a state or
federal constitutional norm could refer to a Covenant provision in order to
determine the scope of that right.99 In this way, the litigant would not be
using the Covenant as the base for a cause of action. Rather, the cause of
action would be based on the federal or state constitutional norm.
Judge Bork's view would not be inconsistent with this manner of using
the Covenant. It is a fashion in which the Covenant is likely to be used
with some frequency. Typically a litigant asserting a right in affirmative
litigation in a state or federal court will have some provision of the federal
or relevant state constitution to use in support. Thus, there would be no
need to use the Covenant to gain the court's jurisdiction. The Covenant
has been used this way in the United Kingdom."°° The Covenant has
also been used in this fashion in the United States, even prior to its
ratification, as litigants have tried to reinforce their constitutional claims
with reference to international standards. 10'
XI. CONCLUSION
The ratification by the United States of the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights opens a range of questions for state and federal
courts. To date, if the scholarly literature and bar publications are an
indication, lawyers are largely unaware of the Covenant and of its potential
98. Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 879 (plaintiffs claimed jurisdiction under both 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and the
Alien Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1350, because plaintiffs were aliens; court found jurisdiction under
28 U.S.C. § 1350 and did not rule on plaintiffs' claim of jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331).
99. See Richard B. Lillich, Invoking International Human Rights Law in Domestic Courts, 54 U.
CIN. L. REv. 367, 408-12 (1985).
100. Derbyshire County Council v. Times Newspaper Ltd., 3 All E.R. 65, 3 W.L.R. 28 (C.A.)
(1992) (opinion of Butler-Sloss, LJ).
101. Jordan Paust, Avoiding "Fraudulent" Executive Policy: Analysis of Non-Self-Execution of the
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 42 DE PAUL L. REv. 1257 (1993).
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uses to establish rights for clients. As lawyers begin to press the Covenant
in litigation, however, courts will be required to determine its applicability.
The courts will be called upon to formulate a position when litigants invoke
a Covenant norm defensively or affirmatively, either by itself or in
conjunction with a constitutional norm. The courts' reaction could range
from a total rejection of any reliance on the Covenant to admitting causes
of action based on the Covenant alone.
It may well be that for a period of time the courts will vary widely in
their use of the Covenant. Such has been the experience in other states that
have ratified it. Some judges may use the Covenant broadly, while others
may shy from it.
In one aspect, the problem will be one of legal research. Few lawyers
in the United States are familiar with the sources in which case law
construing the Covenant is found. The Covenant has already been used by
courts in this country and will continue to be used, so that the usual
research techniques will turn up relevant information. However, the
interpretation of the Covenant is developed by courts of other states of the
world whose case law is less accessible to U.S. lawyers.
The case law is also developed by the Human Rights Committee whose
opinions are published in annual collections by the United Nations. 02
These collections are typically available only in libraries with a collection
of United Nations materials, such as U.N. depository libraries. Lawyers
may need to go outside the usual law libraries to find this material.
Only when the bar becomes familiar with the Covenant's coverage and
the methods of researching Covenant-based rights will the Covenant begin
to affect the contours of rights available to the public in the United States.
If Judge Bork's view of the Covenant's domestic applicability were
102. Each annual collection is titled Report of the Human Rights Committee and is published as a
document of the U.N. General Assembly. In recent years it has been designated as Supplement No. 40
and bears a U.N. document number that reads similar to the following cite: U.N. Doe. A/39/40 (1984).
"A" indicates a document of the General Assembly, as opposed to some other U.N. organ. The first
number indicates the session of the General Assembly, starting from the U.N.'s founding. The numeral
"40" refers to the document as Supplement No. 40. The texts of selected decisions of the Committee
are published in Human Rights Law Journal (International Institute of Human Rights, Strasbourg). A
useful research tool is MANFRED NOWAK, THE INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL
RIGHTS, A COMMENTARY (Kehl, Strasbourg/Arlington 1993) (an article by article commentary on the
Covenant). See also DOMINIC MCGOLDRiCK, THE HUMAN RIGHTS COMMITEE-ITS ROLE IN THE
DEVELOPMENT OF THE INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON CIVrL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS (1991); TORKEL
OPSmAL, THE HUMAN RIGHtTS COMMITTEE, IN THE UNITED NATIONS AND HUMAN RIGHTS-A
CRITICAL APPRAISAL 369 (Philip Alston ed. 1992).
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followed, that impact would still be significant although not nearly as
significant as under a broader reading of applicability.
If the courts follow the Supremacy Clause and give a proper interpreta-
tion to the norms involved in determining the issue, they will reject Judge
Bork's view of the Covenant. Courts will apply the Covenant whenever
it contains relevant rights, whether the litigant invokes the Covenant norm
offensively or defensively, and whether in conjunction with a constitutional
norm or by itself. The ratification of the Covenant by the United States is
a historic milestone by any measure. It remains up to the bar and the
courts to determine precisely how historic that milestone will be.
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